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I. Introduction
The public trust doctrine long has served as a vital means of protecting
the public’s interest in certain natural resources. From common law England
to the present, the public trust doctrine has ensured the public’s right to
access and use navigable waterways and has prevented the government from
unconditionally privatizing those waterways or their resources.1 Public rights
that historically received protection under the public trust doctrine, most
notably navigation and fishing,2 traditionally have shared a common

*
J.D. 2009 Lewis and Clark Law School; B.A. 2001 University of Oregon.
This article grew out of a seminar on the Public Trust Doctrine taught by Professor
Michael Blumm in fall 2008.
1.
See Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-768 (1970) (Magna Charta, from time of its adoption in
England, has been extrapolated through common law to protect public right of
navigation and prohibit several fisheries).
2.
Id. at 781-787; see also Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 383
(1842) (“[t]he sea and its arms are peculiarly and pre-eminently in the king, in respect
to their uses; all of which, at common law, are public, and they are held by the king
for the public benefit, viz., navigation, fishery, the mooring of vessels. . . .”) .
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characteristic: a connection to navigable or tidally influenced water. That
connection has formed a de facto boundary line beyond which courts
historically have been reluctant to extend the public trust doctrine.3
But the public’s interests in access to, use, and management of public
lands and resources are not limited to navigable waterways and the lands
lying beneath them. Indeed, those interests stretch far from navigable bodies
of water to include, among other things, wildlife, parklands, and even the
electromagnetic spectrum.4 This paper addresses the use of the public trust
as an “amphibious” doctrine to protect the public interests associated with
beaches and parks located above the mean high water mark of navigable
waters (“uplands” or dry land).5
The public interests associated with uplands are numerous, including
recreational benefits in accessing and enjoying dry sandy beaches,6 economic
concerns in preventing fraudulent or wasteful disposition of dedicated public
parks,7 and environmental interests in preventing mismanagement of public
parkland,8 to name a few. This paper argues that the public trust doctrine can
and should serve as a means of protecting those interests, regardless of
whether a development affects a navigable or tidally influenced body of
3.
See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (implying that
public trust doctrine does not limit government disposition of dry public lands); see
also Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (public trust doctrine
applies to state management of waterways, but not to state management of land).
4.
See Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France, Lisa A. Hallenbeck, The Public Trust
and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 87 (1995) (arguing that public trust duties apply to wildlife conservation);
Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American
Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 693-701, 713-719 (arguing
that state courts applied public trust principles to regulate private capture of
wildlife); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 269 (1980) (arguing that public trust doctrine applies to federal parklands);
Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource
Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 285 (2004)
(arguing that electromagnetic spectrum is a public resource capable of protection
under public trust doctrine).
5.
In a 1986 article, Scott W. Reed explored the potentially amphibious
nature of the public trust doctrine. Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It
Amphibious?, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107 (1986). That article focused on the application
of public trust principles to the management of upland wilderness areas. This paper
takes a somewhat broader approach, surveying state court decisions that apply
public trust principles to wild and urban parklands as well as decisions that apply
public trust principles to protect the public’s right to access certain tracts of dry land.
6.
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)
(ensuring public access to dry sandy portion of municipal beach).
7.
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966)
(invalidating a state agency lease of state parkland to private party).
8.
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (requiring the
Secretary of Interior to mitigate potential damage to Redwood National Park land).
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water.
An important premise underlying the argument that the public trust
doctrine is amphibious is the notion that the public trust doctrine is a
flexible, not a static doctrine.9 Much like the common law in which it is
founded, the public trust doctrine can adapt to meet the changing values,
needs, and infrastructure of society.10 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
succinctly stated, “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all common law principles,
should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended
to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit.”11 If courts apply the public trust doctrine outside the traditional
context of navigable bodies of water, they can employ a valuable and timetested common law concept to address new and different problems that may
arise in the management of public parks and upland beaches as society
continues to develop consistent with contemporary social concerns.
Another important premise underlying the extension of the public trust
doctrine to uplands is the notion that certain dry lands (notably beaches and
public gathering spaces) are inherently public, and their overall value for
“sociability” purposes is increased when the public has access to them.12 This
notion serves as a rationale for extending the boundaries of the public trust
doctrine, as the cases discussed in this paper have done. Moreover, it also
serves as a limiting principle, insofar as the public trust doctrine should not

9.
See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (“The public uses to
which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public
needs. In administering the [public trust doctrine] the state is not burdened with an
outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another,” citing Colberg,
Inc. v. State, 432 P.2d 3, 12 (Cal. 1967)).
10.
See Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 911-912 (arguing
that public trust doctrine, as a common law doctrine, is “inherently dynamic” and
evolves as the needs of society change); see also Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-338
(1876) (rejecting an argument that public trust doctrine is limited to tidally
influenced waters and extending the doctrine to cover inland navigable rivers and
lakes); see also The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 455 (1851); see also
Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern
View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 579 (1989) (arguing that the public
trust doctrine is “chameleon-like,” because courts apply it to fashion many different
remedies based on the factual context of a case).
11.
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54.
12.
See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 774-781 (1986) (arguing that inherently public
property doctrines - dedication, custom, and the public trust doctrine - traditionally
used to ensure public access to roads and waterways, are equally applicable to lands
customarily used for public gatherings, because the “sociability” value of those lands
increases when the public has greater access to them, much like the “commerce”
value of roads and waterways increases with greater public access). See infra Section
III, notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
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require public access to uplands when no sociability interests are present.13
For about a century, a minority of state courts has recognized the
importance of protecting the public’s interests in upland beaches and parks
and accepted the public trust doctrine as a tool to accomplish that end.
Those courts laid the framework for applying the public trust doctrine to
uplands in a number of different contexts. This paper explores those
decisions and examines their underlying factual contexts, policy rationales,
and legal principles to suggest how, when, and why the public trust doctrine
can and should apply to protect the public’s interests in uplands. When the
public trust doctrine does apply, courts can protect public recreational
interests by ensuring public access to upland beaches and by preventing
government management decisions that curtail the public’s recreational use
of upland parklands.
Section II of this paper provides a brief background of the public trust
doctrine.14 Section III discusses the notion, developed by Professor Carol
Rose, that certain uplands have a “sociability” value that increases with
greater public access to those lands.15 The paper then divides the court
decisions applying the public trust doctrine to uplands into two categories:
access cases (Section IV) and disposition cases (Section V). The former cases
ensure the public’s right to access and use the dry sandy portion of beaches
above the high water mark under the public trust doctrine and the doctrine of
custom; the latter cases address governmental disposition and management
of upland parks under the public trust doctrine. The distinction between
disposition and access cases is a meaningful one, as the former discuss the
substance of the public trust doctrine, while the latter interpret its scope.16
Section VI concludes by recapping the commons elements and public trust
principles discussed in Sections III, IV, and V, and suggests how the
application of the public trust doctrine can lead to better management of
public parks and upland beaches.

II. Background
Courts have applied the public trust doctrine to protect the public’s
13.
See infra Section III, notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
14.
This paper focuses on the public trust doctrine; however, many state
courts have ensured public access to uplands under the doctrine of custom. See infra
note 85. For that reason, this paper briefly addresses the history of the doctrine of
custom to provide the reader with background. See infra note 40.
15.
See Rose, supra note 12.
16.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this distinction. See Neptune
City, 294 A.2d at 53 (“The former [aspect of the public trust doctrine] relates to the
lawful extent of the power of the legislature to alienate trust lands to private parties;
the latter to the inclusion within the doctrine of public accessibility to and use of
such lands for recreation and health, including bathing, boating and associated
activities.”)
168
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interest in accessing and using upland beaches and parks for recreational
purposes. This section briefly outlines the origins of the doctrine and its
substantive content.
The American public trust doctrine originated in Roman law, with the
notion that the public had a right to access and use “the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”17 The English common law
adopted the notion of common public ownership of those resources,
distinguishing between the jus privatum (lands the Crown could transfer to
private individuals in fee simple) and the jus publicum (lands the Crown held
in trust for the general public).18 The jus publicum included, among other
things, the sea, tidally influenced waters, underlying lands, and the
shorelines of such waters below the high water mark.19 The public had a
paramount right to access and use such resources for navigation and fishing
purposes, while the owners of the jus privatum were limited in their ability to
interfere with those interests absent an express grant by the Crown.20
After the Europeans colonized North America, early American state
courts, faced with title disputes in submerged lands, looked to the English
common law for answers. The most prominent of those decisions was Arnold
v. Mundy.21 In Arnold, the plaintiff claimed an exclusive right to farm oysters
from a portion of the bed of the Raritan River and sought to prohibit the
defendant from taking those oysters.22 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
concluded that, as a result of the American Revolution, the people of New
Jersey originally held title to the riverbed at issue for the common use of the
public and could not interfere with that use by conveying that title in fee to
private individuals.23 Because the plaintiff’s title derived from that limited

17.
The Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1 (T. Cooper trans. 3d ed. 1852)
18.
This is an oversimplified history of the adoption and subsequent
application of public trust principles in England. For a comprehensive analysis of
the history of the public trust doctrine in England, see Harrison C. Dunning, Antiquity
of the Public Right, 4 Waters and Water Rights § 29 (Robert E. Beck ed., Matthew Bender
& Co. 1991); see also Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429-430 (1989), and
James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths: A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 19-27 (2007).
19.
For a more extensive analysis of the distinction between jus privatum and
jus publicum, see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1894) (discussing Lord Chief
Justice Hale’s treatise De Jure Maris, 1 Hargrave Tracts 5-44 (1787)).
20.
See Shively, 152 U.S. at 13; see also The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes
Submerged Traditional Doctrine, supra note 1, at 768-769.
21.
6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821)
22.
Id. at 8
23.
Id. at 53-54. Some state courts at the time differed with respect to
whether the state as sovereign could convey title to lands beneath the high water
mark of navigable rivers. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (1 Cush.) 53 (1851)
(upholding state transfer to private landowner of tidelands below the high water
169
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government title, the plaintiff did not hold fee simple title to the riverbed,
and therefore could not prohibit the defendant from harvesting oysters from
the oyster farm.24
Relying in large part on Arnold v. Mundy, the U.S. Supreme Court quickly
acknowledged the thirteen original states’ sovereign power, inherited from
the British Crown following the Revolution, over navigable waters and
underlying lands within the state.25 The Court soon extended this principle to
all newly admitted states under the equal footing doctrine.26 Later, the Court
recognized that the public trust doctrine applied to all navigable waterways
and “inland seas,” regardless of whether those bodies of water were tidally
influenced.27 Together, those decisions placed trust lands in the hands of the
states, which set out to define the public trust for themselves, resulting in a
diverse body of public trust jurisprudence.28
Although often characterized as primarily a creature of state law,29 the
public trust doctrine was heavily influenced by the United States Supreme
Court decision of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,30 which imposed
limits on states’ ability to dispose of public trust lands. In Illinois Central, the
Court upheld the Illinois state legislature’s repeal of a grant of submerged
lands under Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad. The Court
concluded that the grant was necessarily revocable because the lands
granted were subject to the public trust, and the state could not abdicate its
role as trustee over such lands by transferring them to a private party.31 The

mark). However, even in Alger, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized that the
power to convey such lands was necessarily limited by the public’s interest in
unimpeded navigation. Id. at 75. For a thorough examination of public trust
principles in the early state case law, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475-489 (1970).
24.
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 54.
25.
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)
26.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845)
27.
See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-338 (1876) (discussed supra note 10).
Although the Supreme Court eliminated the tidally influenced waters limitation on
the scope of the American public trust doctrine, tidally influenced waters were still
within the purview of the public trust doctrine, even if such waters were not
navigable. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479-480 (1988).
28.
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) (acknowledging state autonomy in
defining the public trust doctrine “according to its own views of justice and policy”); see
also Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 380 (1926) (“[T]he extent of the power of the
State and city to part with property under navigable waters to private persons . . . is a
state question.”).
29.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30.
146 U.S. 387 (1892). In his seminal article on the public trust doctrine,
Professor Sax described Illinois Central as the “most celebrated public trust case in
American law.” Sax, supra note 23, at 489.
31.
Ill. Central, 146 U.S. at 452-53.
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Court listed two exceptions to that general rule: the state may dispose of
public trust lands (1) to promote the interests of the public, or (2) if such
disposition does not substantially impair the public interest in those lands.32
The Illinois Central Court distinguished state title to submerged lands
from state title to dry public lands, implying that the public trust doctrine
applied to the former but not the latter.33 That view is the received wisdom
on the scope of the public trust doctrine.34 Nonetheless, the recent growth in
popularity of outdoor recreation35 has encouraged state and federal courts to
extend the traditional scope to include the dry sandy shores of beaches,36
urban parks,37 rural state parks38 and, to a limited degree, federal parklands.39
Sections IV and V examine those decisions in greater detail.40

32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 452; see supra note 3.
34.
See The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine,
supra note 1, at 781-787.
35.
See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53
(N.J. 1972) (observing that public’s interest in tidal waters has grown to encompass
recreation). The 1994-1995 National Survey on Recreation and the Environment
indicates that, since 1982-1983, the percentage of the U.S. population that
participates in at least one outdoor activity has risen from 89% to 94.5%. R. Jeff
Teasley, H. Ken Cordell, John C. Bergstrom, and Paul Gentle, Recreation and Wilderness
in the United States (1997), available at http://www.agecon.uga.edu/~erag/finalreport.htm.
36.
See Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54; Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571,
573-74 (N.J. 1978); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984);
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005).
37.
See, e.g., Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 160 A.D.2d 835, 837, 554 N.Y.S.2d 269
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
38.
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 122-123 (Mass. 1966).
39.
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 376 F.Supp. 90, 96-96 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
40.
This paper focuses on the application of the public trust doctrine to
protect public interests in access to and use of uplands. However, a number of state
courts have also relied on the doctrine of custom to ensure public access to uplands.
See infra note 85. Although these two doctrines differ, they both ensure public access
to important resources and their underlying rationales are similar.
The doctrine of custom originated in England and recognized a community’s
right to harvest or use certain resources, including grazing lands, timber, and
roadways. Rose, supra note 12, at 739-749 (discussing the history of custom). Also,
citizens asserted customary claims to protect their right to engage in certain
recreational uses, including sporting activities and festivals, on otherwise privately
held land. Id. To successfully assert a customary claim, a litigant had to show that
the customary use was (1) ancient, (2) exercised without interruption, (3) peaceable
and free from dispute, (4) reasonable, (5) certain, (6) obligatory, and (7) not
inconsistent with other customs or law. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *76-78;
See also State ex. rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969) (applying custom
requirements).
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III. The Value of Public Recreational Use of Uplands
The expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond its historical confines
in navigable and tidally influenced waters has generated some criticism.41
Some critics have argued that this expansion threatens the property rights of
private landowners because public access necessarily infringes upon those
landowners’ constitutional right to exclude others.42 This is bad because,
these commentators maintain, the right to exclude is fundamental to
preserving the incentive to use property efficiently.43
Professor Rose responded to this criticism by arguing that, in certain
contexts, increased public access to and use of land can actually enhance the
value of that land.44 Rose started from the premise that certain property,
notably roadways and navigable waterways, is susceptible to the “holdout”
problem, whereby a single landowner can withhold use of her property and
frustrate the completion of a road or the navigability of a waterway.45
Similarly, according to Rose, lands used for recreational purposes are
susceptible to holdout problems.46 According to Rose, courts responded by
applying the public trust doctrine and the related doctrine of custom47 to

41.
See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 18, at 93-103 (arguing that expansive
interpretations of the public trust doctrine have no basis in the historical roots of the
doctrine); see also Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical
Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 79-81 (1976) (arguing that contemporary public trust
jurisprudence misunderstands Roman law as supporting the notion of commonly
held and judicially enforceable rights in resources).
42.
See Huffman, supra note 18, at 99 (“[I]f the jus publicum is just a Latin
term for the public interest, the scope of the public trust is limitless and the
constitutional protections of property rights are a nullity.”). See also Opinion of the
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (concluding that a proposed bill to create a
public ‘on-foot free right-of-passage’ along the shore between the mean high and low
water marks constitutes a taking requiring just compensation to private landowners
under Massachusetts and United States constitutions).
43.
See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, reprinted in Perspectives on
Property Law 45-48 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose, Bruce A. Ackerman eds.,
Little, Brown and Company, 3d ed. 2002); see also Thomas Michael Power,
Environmental Protection and Economic Well Being 61-63 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1996) (arguing
that ability to exclude others from a resource is necessary to realizing a profit from
that resource).
44.
Carol M. Rose, Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
45.
Id. at 749-758.
46.
Id. at 760. Rose argued that recreational sites may be subject to the
holdout problem because communities grow accustomed to holding recreational
events on specific pieces of property which, if privately owned, are subject to the
landowner’s right to exclude. Id.
47.
See supra note 40.
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ensure public access when the elements of those doctrines were satisfied.48
Further, Rose argued that roads, waterways, and recreational sites are more
valuable when commonly, as opposed to privately, owned.49
Rose relied on the concept of “returns to scale,”50 which occur when the
benefit derived from increased public use of land increases in equal or
greater proportion to that increased use.51 In the context of roadways and
waterways, Rose identified enhanced commerce as the benefit derived from
increased public access and use.52 Concerning lands customarily used for
recreational sites, Rose pointed to another aspect of commerce - “sociability”
- that experiences returns to scale when the public is afforded access to those
sites.53 In sum, for roadways, navigable waterways, and lands used for
recreational purposes, public access gains outweigh infringements on rights
to exclude because the benefits to commerce, broadly defined, are greater
when such lands are publicly held, rather than privately.
Rose identified two elements (hereafter referred to as “commons
elements”) that justify judicial elevation of public access over private
property under the public trust: (1) the property is susceptible to a “holdout”
problem, and (2) the property is more valuable when commonly, rather than
privately, held.54 Those commons elements serve as a justification for
ensuring public access to recreational lands as well as limiting the public
right of access when no recreational purpose would be served. As this paper
shows, the commons elements are implicitly or explicitly present in nearly
every judicial decision discussed in Sections IV and V. Consequently, this
paper refers to the holdout problem and the value of public recreational
property to clarify the circumstances under which courts will apply the public
trust doctrine to ensure public access to uplands or evaluate their
management and disposition.

IV. The Access Cases
Courts have ensured public access to upland beaches for recreational

48.
Id.
49.
Id. at 766-771.
50.
Id. at 766-768.
51.
See Joan Robinson, Economic Heresies 52-53 (Basic Books, Inc. 1971).
52.
Rose, supra note 12, at 770. (“[T]he ‘publicness’ of commerce - the
increasing returns from greater participation - . . . attached an ever-increasing value
to a road or waterway, beyond any alternative use of the property. . . .”).
53.
Id. at 775-777. (“[P]erhaps our most important ‘returns to scale’ involve
activities that are somehow sociable or socializing - activities that allow us to get
along with each other.”).
Rose identified education, politeness, sympathy,
appreciation of the environment, and free speech as aspects of sociability that are
enhanced with increased public access to recreational sites. Id. at 775-776, 778-780.
54.
Id. at 774.
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purposes under the public trust doctrine. This section first focuses on the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s use of the public trust doctrine to provide equal
public access to municipal and privately owned upland beaches.55 The
section then considers how the commons elements addressed in Section III,
above, both justify and limit the New Jersey Supreme Court’s protection of
public access to and use of upland beaches.

A. Beach Access Under New Jersey’s Public Trust Doctrine
The New Jersey Supreme Court first discussed the public right to access
upland beaches under the public trust doctrine in 1972, in Borough of Neptune
City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea.56 In Neptune, the ocean-side borough of Avon
had amended a municipal ordinance in 1970 to restrict the issuance of
seasonal beach use permits solely to Avon residents, and raise the daily
beach access fees for nonresidents.57 A neighboring borough, Neptune City,
challenged the ordinance as a violation of the state common law right to
access the beach.58 Relying largely on Arnold v. Mundy59 and Illinois Central,60
the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court, concluding that the
discriminatory application of beach access fees violated the public trust
doctrine by impeding the public’s right to access the upland beach at issue.61
The court extended the public trust doctrine to encompass “recreational
uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities,”62

55.
New Jersey appears to be the only jurisdiction that has ensured public
access to upland beaches under the public trust doctrine. For that reason, Section
IV(A) focuses exclusively on New Jersey case law. However, in 2003, North Carolina
enacted a statute recognizing a public right of access to and use of upland beaches.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§77-20(d) and (e) (2003). Private landowners challenged that statute
as an unconstitutional taking, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the
lawsuit on procedural grounds. See Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 621 S.E.2d 19, 27-29
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming dismissal of injunctive relief and declaratory judgment
claims to quiet title in upland beach property on sovereign immunity grounds).
56.
294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
57.
Id. at 50-51.
58.
Id. The beach property at issue was municipally owned. Thus, private
property rights and takings issues were not present in the litigation.
59.
6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821), discussed supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
60.
146 U.S. 387 (1892), discussed supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
61.
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 55. The court later qualified this holding by
noting that a municipality may charge non-residents higher access fees to the extent
that residents finance beach facilities through payment of local property taxes.
Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 393 A.2d 579, 581 (N.J. 1978). In Hyland, the court also
concluded that municipalities may not prohibit non-residents from using municipal
toilet facilities located near public beaches. Id. at 582. The court, however, expressly
declined to rest that conclusion on the public trust doctrine. Id.
62.
Id. at 54-55.
174

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

acknowledging the flexibility of the public trust doctrine,63 the scarcity of
beach property, and the importance of such property to the public welfare.64
Six years after Neptune, the New Jersey Supreme Court reexamined the
public trust doctrine in the 1978 case of Van Ness v. Borough of Deal.65 In Van
Ness, the New Jersey Public Advocate argued that the borough of Deal
discriminated against non-residents in violation of the public trust doctrine
by restricting membership in a municipally owned casino and beach resort to
residents of Deal.66 Deal claimed that Neptune was distinguishable because it
was limited to the portion of the beach between the low and high water
marks, and because the Deal beach, unlike the beach in Neptune, had not
been dedicated by the borough as a public beach.67 Reversing the New Jersey
Appellate Division, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected those arguments,
concluding that the public trust doctrine applied to the upland sand area.68
The majority stressed that the dwindling availability of beach property
necessitated prompt judicial action,69 rejecting the dissent’s position that
public access to beach property is better left to the legislature.70
Both Neptune City and Van Ness enforced the public trust doctrine to
ensure public access to municipally owned dry upland beaches. The New
Jersey Supreme Court took the first step in applying the public trust doctrine
to privately owned beaches in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n.71 In
Matthews, a resident of Point Pleasant sought access to a beach in the
borough of Bay Head.72 The beach at issue had seventy-six lots, seventy of
which were privately owned.73 The Bay Head Improvement Association
(Association) owned the remaining six lots in fee and restricted its
membership to Bay Head residents.74
Reversing the New Jersey Appellate Division, which had affirmed the

63.
Id. at 54. (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles,
should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to
meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”).
64.
Id. at 53.
65.
393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978).
66.
Id. at 571.
67.
Id. at 573-574.
68.
Id at 574. The court also noted that dedication of the beach to public use
is immaterial. Id.
69.
Id. at 574.
70.
Id. at 576 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
71.
471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984).
72.
Id. at 358.
73.
Id. at 359.
74.
Id. The Association also held leases in the sandy upland portion of a
number of private beachfront lots. In the summer months, the Association restricted
beach use during the day to Association members, thereby preventing nonresidents
from using the beach. Id.
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Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment for the Association, the New
Jersey Supreme Court observed that the public’s right to use the foreshore is
often dependent on a right to pass across the upland beach, concluding that
the public had a right under the public trust doctrine to pass across privately
owned uplands to access the foreshore.75 Further, the court noted that the
public’s interest in the upland sands is not limited to passage but also
includes “some enjoyment of the dry sand area.”76 The decision thus
extended the public trust doctrine, as announced in Avon, to include privately
owned upland beaches, although not without some limitations.77
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently enforced the public trust
doctrine against privately held beach uplands in 2005 in Raleigh Avenue Beach
Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.78 In Raleigh, the Raleigh Avenue Beach
Association (“Association”) sought access to a 480-foot wide stretch of
upland sand beach owned by the Atlantis Beach Club (“Atlantis”), a private
beach club.79 To determine the extent of the public’s right of access to and
use of Atlantis’ private upland beach under the public trust doctrine, the
court applied four factors central to the decision in Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass’n.80 Affirming the Appellate Division, the court concluded that
Atlantis’ upland beach “must be available for use by the general public under
the public trust doctrine” in light of the following facts: (1) the “longstanding
public access to and use of the beach” permitted by Atlantis’ predecessor in
interest, (2) a New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
development permit condition requiring public access to the beach at issue,
(3) documented public demand for access to the beach at issue, (4) the lack
75.
Id. at 364. The court observed that the public right of access is not
unrestricted; reasonable access is all that is required. Id.
76.
Id. at 365.
77.
Id. The court noted that the public’s rights in private beaches are not “coextensive with the rights enjoyed in municipal beaches.” Id.
78.
879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
79.
Id. at 113. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
also played a major role in the litigation. In 1986, the DEP issued a development
permit to Atlantis’ predecessor in interest on condition that the public be afforded
access to and use of the beach at issue. Id. at 114. In 2003, DEP filed an
administrative action against Atlantis for violating the permit when Atlantis closed
beach access to the public. Id. at 116. A large part of the ensuing court opinion dealt
with DEP’s authority to review Atlantis’ beach access fees, and is beyond the scope of
this paper. The court ultimately concluded that DEP had authority to review the fees
on the ground that Atlantis’ construction of a boardwalk constituted a “development”
triggering DEP jurisdiction. Id. at 125.
80.
Id. at 121-124. In Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court listed four
factors it would consider in determining the scope of public use of private upland
beaches: (1) location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, (2) extent and
availability of publicly owned upland sand area, (3) nature and extent of the public
demand, and (4) usage of the upland sand by the owner. Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
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of nearby publicly owned beaches, and (5) Atlantis’ use of the beach as a
private club.81 The court failed to explain the extent of the public use
required by its decision, although it did observe that Atlantis could charge
reasonable fees to the extent required for management services, subject to
the supervision of the DEP.82
From Neptune City in 1972 through Raleigh Avenue in 2005, the New Jersey
Supreme Court removed the public trust doctrine from its historical confines
in navigable and tidally influenced waters and applied it to protect the
public’s recreational access to dry upland beaches.83 New Jersey thus
established itself in the forefront of public trust jurisprudence in the context
of public beach access,84 serving as a paradigm for jurisdictions grappling
with the problem of increased public demand for limited upland beach
resources.85
81.
Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n at 124.
82.
Id. at 125. The dissent argued that the public’s access and use rights
under the public trust doctrine would have been satisfied by opening a ten-foot-wide
strip of Atlantis’ upland beach area to the public. Id. at 129 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
83.
See Raleigh Avenue, 879 A.2d at 119-120 (observing that the New Jersey
Supreme Court has extended the public trust doctrine from traditional public rights
of navigation and commerce in tidal lands to encompass recreational use of upland
beaches).
84.
See Timothy Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, “Waterlocked”: Public Access to New
Jersey’s Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 579, 608 (2007) (“New Jersey has been at the
forefront of the evolution of modern public access rights under the public trust
doctrine. . . .”)
85.
A handful of jurisdictions have also ensured similar public rights of
access to and use of upland beaches for recreational purposes under the doctrine of
custom. Although this paper primarily focuses on the public trust doctrine,
decisions applying custom shed light on alternative approaches to protecting public
rights in uplands. For that reason, they are briefly discussed below. For an outline of
the history and substantive content of the doctrine of custom, see supra note 40.
Oregon was one of the first states to ensure public access to upland beaches
under the doctrine of custom. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). In
Thornton, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a court of appeals’ injunction against
private landowners from fencing off a portion of their land located in the “dry-sand
area” located between the mean high-tide line and the vegetation line. Id. at 672.
The court declined to base its decision on doctrines of implied dedication or
prescription argued at the trial and appellate level; instead, on its own initiative, the
court relied on the doctrine of custom. Id. at 676. Briefly applying the seven
elements of custom mentioned in Blackstone’s Commentaries, see supra note 40, the
court concluded that the underlying facts satisfied those elements. Id. at 677. In
particular, the court noted the long history of public use of the dry-sand area of the
beach for “picnics, gathering wood, building warming fires” and the historical
unsuitability of the dry-sand area for any other purposes. Id. at 673-674. The court
thus established a sweeping rule ensuring public access to the upland dry-sand area
along the entire Oregon coastline.
Other jurisdictions have recognized varying degrees of public rights in upland
beaches under the doctrine of custom. See In re Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77
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B. Commons Elements In Beach Access Cases
The beach access cases discussed in this section are not the result of
unrestrained judicial zeal for public access at the expense of private property
rights. Instead, each decision was a measured response to the privatization
of a limited and vital public resource, as the commons elements discussed in
Section III demonstrate.
First, upland beaches are a finite resource susceptible to private
“holdout” power.86 In each decision discussed below, private landowners
sought to exclude the public from an upland beach property in order to retain
that property for their own use. This sort of exclusion does not present a
holdout problem if the public can easily recreate in other locales.87 But as
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, “[o]ceanfront property is uniquely
suitable for bathing and other recreational activities. Because it is unique
and highly in demand, there is growing concern about the reduced
‘availability to the public of its priceless beach areas.’”88 Given upland
beaches’ connection to the ocean, they offer one-of-a-kind recreational
opportunities that the public cannot engage in elsewhere.
Beyond the limited availability of upland beaches, the decisions

(Haw. 1968) (relying on historical Hawaiian custom and practice to establish the
seaward property boundary of “royal patents” issued by King Kamehameha V to
private persons at the “upper reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidenced by the
edge of vegetation”); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So.2d 73, 77-78 (Fla.
1974) (observing that the public’s right to access and use upland beaches for
recreational purposes may be protected under the doctrine of custom when the
elements of custom are met); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tex. App. 1986)
(recognizing a customary public right to access and use beaches seaward of the
vegetation line for recreational purposes); United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc.,
386 F.Supp. 769, 772-773 (D. V.I. 1974) (upholding injunction against private
landowner from fencing in upland property in light of customary public right of
access and use).
86.
Almost all natural resources can be characterized as finite. However, the
increasingly high demand for access to and use of unique upland beaches for
recreational purposes, as demonstrated by the case law discussed in this section,
makes the finite nature of those lands particularly apparent.
87.
See Rose, supra note 12, at 758 (noting a lack of a holdout problem where
the public can engage in a specific recreational activity in numerous places).
88.
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984)
(quoting Van Ness, 393 A.2d at 574 (N.J. 1978)); see also Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property
Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 1981) (noting that use of upland beaches is
“practically inseparable from enjoyment of ocean swimming”); Gion v. City of Santa
Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 29, 43, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970) (noting that increased urbanization of
California’s coastline has rendered shoreline areas sufficiently definite to justify
application of implied dedication). The holdout problem is less evident in sparsely
populated western states. However, as the population increases, greater public
demand is bound to give rise to holdout problems.
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discussed in this section also identify a value in public access to and use of
upland beaches that outweighs the land’s value when there is a private right
to exclude. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted the importance of public
recreational use of upland beaches to the public welfare.89 The Oregon
Legislature also emphasized the importance of recreational use of upland
beaches in a statute preserving public access to the Oregon coast.90 And the
Florida Supreme Court waxed poetic about the value of public access to and
recreational use of upland beaches.91 These legislative and judicial
statements demonstrate that public access to upland beaches has a value
that, although difficult to quantify, is integral to the overall public welfare.92
The commons elements93 also indicate when public access to uplands
should yield to private landowners’ right to exclude. When the uplands at
issue are not susceptible to the holdout power, and when the value of public
access is minimal, the right to exclude should prevail.94

V. The Disposition Cases
The public trust doctrine is not limited to cases ensuring public access
to public trust lands. Instead, the doctrine also can enable courts to oversee

89.
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 53. See also Matthews, 471 A.2d at 363 (“[h]ealth,
recreation and sports are encompassed in and intimately related to the general
welfare of a well-balanced state. Extension of the public trust doctrine to include
bathing, swimming and other shore activities is consonant with and furthers the
general welfare.”) (citation omitted).
90.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610(4) (“The Legislative Assembly further declares
that it is in the public interest to do whatever is necessary to preserve and protect
scenic and recreational use of Oregon’s ocean shore.”); see also OR. REV. STAT. §
390.010(2) (“The economy and well-being of the people are in large part dependent
upon proper utilization of the state’s outdoor recreation resources for the physical,
spiritual, cultural, scientific and other benefits which such resources afford.”).
91.
See Daytona Beach, 294 So.2d at 75 (“We recognize the propriety of
protecting the public interest in, and right to utilization of, the beaches and oceans
of the State of Florida. No part of Florida is more exclusively hers, nor more properly
utilized by her people than her beaches.”).
92.
See Rose, supra note 12, at 780 (“The public’s recreational use arguably is
the most valuable use of [beaches] and requires an entire expanse of beach (for
unobstructed walking, viewing, contemplation) which could otherwise be blocked
and ‘held up’ by private owners.”).
93.
See supra Section III note 54 and accompanying text.
94.
The factors announced in Matthews (see supra note 81) demonstrate how a
court can balance the public right of access with private property rights. For
example, where the upland beach is removed from the ocean, other public beaches
are nearby, public demand for the upland beach is minimal, and the private
landowner is making use of her upland beach, the private landowner should be able
to exclude the public.
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state or municipal management or disposition of trust lands.95 The cases
discussed in this section all involved judicial oversight of federal, state, and
local government management of upland trust lands and demonstrate that
the public trust doctrine is not, and should not be, limited to the traditional
context of navigable waters and their underlying lands.

A. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission
In Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission,96 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court considered a citizen challenge of actions taken by the Greylock
Reservation Commission (Commission) and the Mount Greylock Tramway
Authority (Authority) regarding the Greylock State Reservation.97 The
Massachusetts legislature established the Greylock State Reservation in 1898
and created the Commission, with authority to acquire additional land for the
park.98 Over a half-century later, in 1953, the legislature created the Authority
for the purpose of constructing and operating an aerial tramway99 within the
park, to be paid for through the sale of revenue bonds.100 The Authority
struggled to obtain underwriting for the revenue bonds until 1964, when it
entered into an agreement with American Resort Services, Inc.101 That
agreement proved to be financially disadvantageous to the Authority,
resulted in a substantial delegation of the Authority’s power to the resort,
and involved the construction of ski facilities much more extensive than the

95.
Professor Sax identified three general restrictions state courts have
imposed on governmental authority under the public trust doctrine: (1) trust
property must be used for a public purpose and open to the public, (2) trust property
may not be sold, and (3) trust property must be maintained for particular types of
uses. See Sax, supra note 21, at 477. Section IV discussed the first restriction.
Section V discussed the latter two restrictions. See also Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 53
(“[One aspect of the public trust doctrine] relates to the lawful extent of the power of
the legislature to alienate trust lands to private parties.”).
96.
215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966).
97.
Id. at 116. At the time of the litigation, the Reservation included
approximately 8800 acres of wilderness surrounding Mt. Greylock, a 3491-foot-high
mountain.
98.
Id.
99.
In addition to the tramway, the Authority was authorized to construct “all
appurtenances thereto,” which included, among other things, parking facilities, ski
facilities, restaurants and gift shops. Id. at 118 n 6.
100.
Id. at 118-119. The arrangement was somewhat complex, involving the
leasing of 4000 acres of the reservation by the Commission to the Authority.
Through that lease, the Commission delegated its maintenance obligation of the
leased lands to the Authority.
101.
Id. at 119-120. The resort was a joint venture between Allen & Company,
an investment house, and Willamette Construction Company. Id.
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original tramway project authorized by the enabling legislation.102 After the
Authority and the resort executed the agreement, but before the project
began, a group of citizens unsuccessfully petitioned the Superior Court to
invalidate the 4000-acre lease and the agreement.103
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which reversed the Superior
Court’s upholding of the lease, observed that the Greylock Reservation, as
rural park land, was not to “be diverted to another inconsistent use without
plain and explicit legislation to that end.”104 The court examined the statute
that authorized construction of the tramway, failing to find language
supporting a project of the scale envisioned by the Authority and the
resort.105 For that reason, the court concluded that the Commission’s 4000acre lease to the Authority exceeded the scope of the statute.106 The court
also ruled that the statute did not authorize the Authority to delegate its
statutory functions to the resort to the extent contemplated by the
agreement.107 The court ultimately invalidated both the 4000-acre lease and
the agreement.108
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not expressly invoke
the public trust doctrine, commentators regularly cite its decision in Greylock
for its public trust implications.109 Greylock announced that as manager of
trust land the government may not divert land devoted to one public use to
an inconsistent use without explicit legislation authorizing such
disposition.110 This rule serves as a principle of statutory construction

102.
Id. at 119-121. The court specifically referenced the impact the proposed
ski facilities would have on the ecology of the reservation, noting that the chair lifts
would require removal of trees and vegetation on 226 acres. Id. at 120.
103.
Id. at 116.
104.
Id. at 121 (quoting Higginson v. Slattery, 99 N.E. 523, 527-528 (Mass. 1912)).
105.
Id. at 122-123.
106.
Id. at 123.
107.
Id. at 124.
108.
Id. at 126.
109.
See, e.g., Sax, supra note 23, at 492 (arguing that Greylock has important
implications for the public trust doctrine); Peter Egan, Applying Public Trust Tests to
Congressional Attempts to Close National Park Areas, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 717, 721
(1998) (arguing that Gould is the seminal public trust case in Massachusetts);
Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 466 (arguing that Gould applied the public trust doctrine
to state parks).
110.
Greylock, 215 N.E.2d at 122 (“We thus are to interpret the relevant
statutory provisions strictly and as permitting within this forest reservation no activities
inconsistent with the apparent purpose of [the enabling legislation], except as the
Legislature, in the exercise of those powers which it possesses, may clearly have
given permission for them.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Sax, supra
note 21, at 494 (“[The Greylock] court devised a legal rule which imposed a
presumption that the state does not ordinarily intend to divert trust properties in
such a manner as to lessen public uses.”). The court later clarified this rule,
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enabling courts to closely examine legislative dispositions of trust lands.111 If
the legislature fails to adequately identify the public interest served by
disposing of or diverting trust lands, courts can invalidate the transfer.112
Further, as evidenced by the Greylock decision, that interpretive rule applies to
all trust lands, regardless of a connection to navigable or tidally influenced
waters, including uplands above the high water mark.

B. Management of Urban Parks Under the Public Trust
Doctrine
Many states also have applied public trust principles to the
management of upland urban parks.113 For example, in Williams v. Gallatin,114
the New York Court of Appeals invalidated a ten-year lease of the Arsenal
Building in New York’s Central Park by the commissioner of Parks to the
Safety Institute of America to establish a safety and sanitation museum in
the building.115 The court reversed the New York Appellate Division,
observing that public parks “facilitate free public means of pleasure,
recreation, and amusement, and thus provide for the welfare of the
community.”116 In contrast, the court noted, the purpose of the proposed

requiring that a diversion of trust land to another inconsistent use must be
authorized by legislation that identifies (a) the land to be diverted, (b) the current
use of that land, and (c) the proposed use of that land. Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. Works,
244 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1969) (enjoining state agency diversion of parklands for
construction of a highway).
111.
See Blumm, supra note 10, at 587-589 (arguing that the public trust
doctrine can serve as a rule of statutory interpretation requiring explicit legislative
identification of public purposes served by diversion of trust lands).
112.
Id. at 588 n.69 and accompanying text.
113.
This subsection focuses on three jurisdictions, New York, California, and
Pennsylvania, to illustrate the public trust principles applied by many states to
protect urban upland parks. See, e.g., Citizens For Preservation of Buehler Park v. City of
Rolla, 230 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (citizens have standing under public
trust doctrine to challenge city’s disposition of dedicated park land); Paepcke v. Public
Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18-21 (Ill. 1970) (citizens have standing under
public trust doctrine to challenge city’s diversion of public park lands for school
facilities, but legislation authorized the diversion); Lord v. City of Wilmington, 332 A.2d
414, 418-420 (Del. Ch. 1975) (citizens have standing under public trust doctrine to
challenge city’s diversion of an urban park to construct a water tower). But see Larson
v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that public trust
doctrine applies only to navigable waterways and does not limit state’s ability to sell
uplands within state wildlife management area). For further discussion on states’
use of the public trust doctrine to protect upland urban parks, see Serena M. Williams,
Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks be Protected Under the Public Trust Doctrine?,
10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 23 (2002).
114.
128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920).
115.
Id. at 123.
116.
Id.
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museum was to promote public safety and health.117 The court therefore
invalidated the lease, concluding that, because the relation between these
two purposes was remote, the lease impermissibly diverted park resources
from traditional park purposes without direct and specific approval by the
state legislature.118
Williams established the rule that park areas in New York are impressed
with a public trust, and their use for other than park purposes requires direct
and specific approval by the state legislature. New York courts have applied
this rule to order the removal of city sanitation equipment from a public
park,119 invalidate the reconveyance of dedicated public parkland to a private
developer,120 and to uphold the conveyance of parkland for the construction
of low-income housing.121
California also has prevented government diversion of dedicated public
parks to inconsistent uses. In Big Sur Properties v. Mott,122 the California Court
of Appeal affirmed a Superior Court decision upholding the denial of a
private landowner’s application for a permit allowing a vehicular right of way
over a state park.123 The court observed that the park had been privately
dedicated to the public for use as a park, was held by the state in trust for the
public, and the state lacked the power to “divert the use of the property from
its dedicated purposes.”124 The court determined that use of the property as a
right-of-way was “fundamental[ly]” inconsistent with traditional park
purposes and concluded that the state properly denied the landowner’s
application.125 Since Big Sur Properties, California courts have used the public
trust doctrine to prevent a county from renovating a fairground acquired
through private deed126 and to enjoin a city from selling a public library to a
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Ackerman v. Steisel, 104 A.D.2d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
120.
Ellington Constr. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 152 A.D.2d 365, 378-79 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989).
121.
Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 160 A.D.2d 835 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). In
Grayson, the court found specific legislative approval supporting conveyance of the
parkland at issue because it “liberally construe[d]” the legislation in light of the
public purpose of encouraging the development of low-income housing. Id. at 837.
122.
132 Cal. Rptr. 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
123.
Id. at 840.
124.
Id. at 838.
125.
Id. at 838-839. The landowner also argued that the state had the
discretion to grant a permit for a right-of-way under California Public Resources
Code § 5003.5, which authorizes the provision of a “means of ingress to and egress
from all state parks.” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §5003.5. The court rejected that argument,
concluding that the public trust doctrine could be abrogated only through explicit
legislation. Big Sur Properties, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
126.
County of Solano v. Handlery, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 207-212 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (concluding that public trust doctrine restricted county’s ability to divert
183

West

Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010

developer.127
Pennsylvania has taken a similar approach to protecting public use of
upland urban parks. For example, in Board of Trustees of Philadelphia Museums v.
Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania,128 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Common Pleas order setting aside Philadelphia’s conveyance of
public park lands to the University of Pennsylvania. The court observed that
Philadelphia had dedicated the land at issue to public use as a park, held the
land subject to a public trust, and lacked the power to convey it for private
purposes.129 Pennsylvania courts have since applied the Board of Trustees rule
to prevent the sale of a public square to private interests,130 prohibit the
diversion of public parkland for the construction of a school,131 and uphold
the construction of an amphitheatre on public park land.132
The Pennsylvania Constitution also provides protection to upland parks
in Pennsylvania. Article I, section 27, of the Pennsylvania Constitution
requires Pennsylvania to protect the public use of upland parks.133 In
Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,134 the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania interpreted that provision as self-executing and
concluded that it imposed a duty on the state Attorney General to enforce its

dedicated parkland and rejecting county’s argument that public trust doctrine is
limited to tidelands).
127.
Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Com. v. City Council, 263 Cal. Rptr. 896,
902-904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
128.
96 A. 123 (Pa. 1915).
129.
Id. at 125. In a later case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reserved the
question as to whether the state legislature could constitutionally authorize the sale
of public parks to private entities. See Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649, 655
(Pa. 1950).
130.
Hoffman, 75 A.2d at 655. In Hoffman, the court enjoined the sale of a public
square to a private party for the purpose of raising revenue, noting that the value of
the square for recreation and health purposes outweighed the value of increased
revenue. Id. at 654.
131.
In re Conveyance of 1.2 Acres of Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area School Dist., 4
Pa. D. & C.4th 343, 354-355 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1988), aff’d, In re Conveyance of 1.2 Acres of
Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area School Dist., 567 A.2d 750 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989),
overruled on other grounds by In re Erie Golf Course, 963 A.2d 605 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
132.
Bernstein v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa. 1951). In Bernstein, the
court upheld the construction of an amphitheatre in a public park, noting that such
use is consistent with park purposes, which include “aesthetic recreation and mental
and cultural entertainment.” Id.
133.
Article I, section 27 provides: “The people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property
of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources,
the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.” PA. CONST. ART. I, § 27.
134.
302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
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requirements.135 The same court clarified the judicial review required under
Article I, section 27, in Payne v. Kassab,136 stating that a court must determine
whether a government action (1) complied with all applicable statutes and
regulations, (2) demonstrated a reasonable effort to minimize environmental
incursion, and (3) balanced the benefit of disposition with the risk of
environmental harm.137
The Pennsylvania Constitution thus provides
additional protection to upland parks by forcing state agencies to consider
potential environmental harm that may result from management decisions
concerning those parks.
In sum, many state courts have employed public trust principles to
protect public interests in free and open public parks from legislative
diversions to inconsistent uses. Such state court decisions have recognized
both the limited availability of public parks, as well as the importance of such
parks to the general public welfare.138 Finally, those decisions applied public
trust principles to upland parks regardless of a connection to navigable or
tidally influenced waters.

C. The Redwood National Park Litigation
One federal district court also has invoked public trust principles in the
context of federal management of the Redwoods National Park. In Sierra Club
v. Dep’t of the Interior,139 the Sierra Club sought an injunction directing the
Department of the Interior (Department) to prevent damage to the Redwood
National Park caused by logging adjacent to the park.140 The Sierra Club
argued that the department had a judicially enforceable duty under the
National Park System Act141 and the Redwood National Park Act142 to take

135.
Id. at 892. In Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, the Pennsylvania Attorney
General, at the urging of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, sought to enjoin the
erection of a large tower near the Gettysburg National Military Park. Id. at 887-888.
The court noted that Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution authorized
the Attorney General, as trustee of park lands, to challenge the tower’s erection, but
concluded on limited review that testimony in the record supported the lower court
decision to allow the erection of the tower. Id. at 892-895.
136.
312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
137.
Id. at 94. The court in Payne concluded that a street-widening project
complied with article. I, section 27, even though it resulted in the elimination of a
half-acre of public parkland. Id. at 94-96.
138.
See infra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.
139.
376 F.Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
140.
Id. at 92.
141.
16 U.S.C. § 1. That statute provides, in part: “The [National Park Service]
shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks . . .
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”
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steps to protect the park from the harmful effects of logging on adjacent
lands.143 The court denied the department’s motion to dismiss, concluding
that the two statutes imposed a judicially enforceable duty on the agency to
take steps to protect the park from nearby logging.144
When the department failed to take action, Sierra Club again filed suit,
arguing that the agency had failed to meet its trust obligation.145 The federal
district court again agreed, determining that the department had failed to
implement any recommendations made under a series of reports it
commissioned, save for certain “cooperative agreements” the agency reached
with timber companies.146 The court therefore ordered the department to
take “reasonable steps within a reasonable time” to carry out its duty as
trustee to protect the park from further damage by timber companies.147
Although the court in the Redwood Park litigation applied public trust
principles to protect upland federal parklands, its conclusions suffer from
some limitations. The court’s decisions were based in part on a statute
applicable solely to the Redwood National Park.148 Also, Congress amended
the National Park Service Organic Act in 1978 to clarify the National Park
Service’s statutory duties and provide additional protection to national
parks,149 and one court concluded that that amendment restricted any public
trust duties to those specifically contained in the statute.150 Nonetheless,
142.
16 U.S.C. § 79a et seq. The relevant provision of that statute requires the
Secretary of the Interior to protect the Redwood National Park by entering into
cooperative agreements with neighboring landowners to mitigate adverse effects on
park lands occasioned by logging. 16 U.S.C. § 79c(e).
143.
Sierra Club, 376 F.Supp. at 92-94.
144.
Id. at 95-96. The court noted that it could not substitute its judgment for
the Secretary’s, but could review any action taken by the Secretary to determine
whether it was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there
has been a clear error of judgment.” Id. at 96.
145.
Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior II, 398 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
146.
Id. at 293. The court characterized the cooperative agreements as
inadequate in light of their unenforceability and numerous qualifications. Id. at 292.
147.
Id. at 294. One year later, the Sierra Club again sued the department,
arguing that it still had failed to implement adequate protections. Sierra Club v. Dep’t of
Interior III, F.Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976). However, this time the court determined that
the agency had pursued all reasonable measures available in light of limited funding by
Congress and concluded that it had fulfilled its duty as trustee. Id. at 174-176. Despite
the court’s refusal to force the agency to take additional protective measures, the
litigation eventually led to 1978 legislation that provided additional protection to the
park. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
148.
16 U.S.C. § 79a.
149.
16 U.S.C. § 1. See Act of March 27, 1978, P.L.95-250, 92 Stat. 166 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1).
150.
In Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F.Supp. 443, 449 (D. D.C. 1980), the court
concluded that the legislative history underlying that amendment indicated that
Congress intended to eliminate any extra-statutory public trust duty on the Secretary
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some commentators argue that the National Park Service Organic Act
imposes general public trust duties on the federal government as manager of
federal parklands.151

D. Commons Elements in Disposition Cases
Much like a private property owner’s exercise of her right to exclude the
public, misguided or arbitrary government managerial decisions can curtail
the public’s ability to access and use upland park resources.152 A
government’s lease of public parkland for commercial development may
result in destruction of the scenic value the park was originally established to
protect.153 A municipality’s use of urban parks for non-park purposes may
infringe on the public’s ability to recreate in those parks.154 And the
government’s failure to adequately protect limited and priceless park
resources may restrict the public’s ability to enjoy and appreciate those
resources.155 The cases discussed above reflect the notion that urban and
rural parklands are a finite resource, and courts can protect them from
government management and disposition inconsistent with park purposes.
Additionally, the case law establishes the paramount importance of the
public’s right to use upland parks for recreational purposes. The public’s
recreational use of upland parks confers a benefit not only on the individual,
but also on the community at large.156 As noted by Professor Rose, the
of the Interior. See also Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F.Supp. 842, 866 (D.C. Colo. 1985) (“[I]t
is not for the courts to say how [the public] trust shall be administered. That is for
Congress to determine. Where Congress has set out statutory directives . . . for the
management and protection of public lands, those statutory duties comprise all the
responsibilities which defendants must faithfully discharge.”) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
151.
See Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 290-293 (arguing that language in the 1978
amendments continues to impose a general public trust duty on the National Park
Service); see also Egan, supra note 109, at 731-732 (same).
152.
Poor government management of parklands can be seen as an inverse of
the traditional holdout problem examined by Rose, supra note 12, at 749-761.
Although the cases discussed in Section IV do not involve private landowners
“holding out” their property from public use, government disposition of public land
to a private entity or diversion of public land to a use inconsistent with park
purposes can have the same effect by curtailing public recreational use of upland
parks.
153.
See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 118, n.4, 120 (lease
of parkland to construct ski facilities thereon would result in removal of trees and
vegetation on land “frequently visited by students, ornithologists, scientists, and
naturalists, as well as by tourists, motorists, and persons walking on the trails”).
154.
Board of Trustees of Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania, 96 A. 123
(Pa. 1915)
155.
See Sierra Club (I) and (II), 376 F.Supp. at 95-96, 398 F.Supp. at 293-294.
156.
See Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1920). (public parks provide
“free public means of pleasure, recreation, and amusement, and thus provide for the
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public’s enjoyment of upland parks has a certain sociability value that
experiences increasing returns to scale with increased public access to and
use of those parks.157 Further, urban parks provide a unique forum for public
speech,158 and the disposition or diversion of those parks reduces the
availability of a locale for such activities.159 Such uses are integral to the
public welfare and arguably outweigh the monetary benefits gained by
disposing of parkland or diverting it to an inconsistent use.
The public trust doctrine does not and should not apply to all uplands
managed by the government. First, public trust principles may not apply to
upland parks when the commons elements160 are not present. If the park at
issue is not subject to a holdout problem (i.e., the park is a large tract of
public land), or if the park has little value for sociability purposes, the public
trust doctrine might not apply.161 Second, uplands must be dedicated in
some manner to public use in order for the doctrine to apply.162 When
uplands are not dedicated to public use, federal, state, and local government
managers may be free to dispose of them as they see fit.

VI. Conclusion
Many different entities have a stake in upland beaches and parks used
by the public for recreational purposes. Private landowners wish to protect
their right to exclude others. State, federal, and local governments seek to
manage public uplands and sometimes dispose of them to raise revenue or

welfare of the community.”); see also Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.
1950) (“[H]uman values - air, light, rest, recreation and health which can be derived
from any public square - are more important and valuable to the citizens of
Pittsburgh than the increased revenue which will likely be produced by a sale of this
public property.”).
157.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
158.
See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-178 (1983) (noting that parks are
traditional forums associated with the free exercise of expressive activities).
159.
See Rose, supra note 12, at 778 (arguing that free speech, along with
commerce, is a socializing practice for society, and is a rationale for preserving public
access and use of public parks).
160.
See supra Section III note 54 and accompanying text.
161.
This observation is supported by the broad tracts of federally owned
uplands that are not subject to the public trust doctrine. See Wilkinson, supra note 4,
at 273-277 (noting that the public trust doctrine traditionally does not apply to
federal public lands); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (implying
that the public trust doctrine does not apply to public uplands).
162.
Dedication of a park to public use can occur expressly in a deed
conveying property to a government, see Bernstein v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 452, 454
(Pa. 1951), through formal declaration of dedication by a government, Board of Trustees
of Philadelphia Museums v. Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania, 96 A. 123, 123-124 (Pa. 1915), or
impliedly through a long history of public use, see Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d
649, 650-651 (Pa. 1950).
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encourage alternative uses. And the general public has an interest in
accessing and using upland beaches and parks for recreational purposes.
Those interests regularly conflict and, when they do, the general public often
is at a distinct disadvantage in light of the inherent difficulty in organizing a
multitude of disorganized citizens (many of whom are uninterested) to
defend a commonly held right.163
Fortunately, courts can and do apply the public trust doctrine to protect
rights held by this disorganized public, even when navigable or tidally
influenced waters are not involved. But they do not do so as a matter of
course; instead, the uplands at issue must satisfy the “commons elements,”
as discussed in Section III.164 First, the land at issue must be subject to some
form of holdout power, either through a private landowner’s ability to
exclude, or through a government’s ability to divert or dispose to an
inconsistent use.165 The unique and finite nature of public parks and upland
beaches, as well as the rising demand for their use occasioned by an
increasing population, make the holdout problem especially pronounced.166
Second, the land at issue must be more valuable when used publicly
than when privately owned or diverted to an inconsistent use.167 Although
that value may be difficult to quantify, it is no less real, as is demonstrated by
courts and legislatures that regularly extol the benefits to the public welfare

163.
See Note, supra note 1, at 762 n. 4 (acknowledging difficulty general public
faces in protecting “fleeting” access and use interests); see also Sax, supra note 23, at 560
(noting that disputes involving public resources often pit “self-interested and
powerful” minorities against a “disorganized and diffuse majority”).
Many
commentators also argue that, in the context of legislative decisions regarding public
lands, private interest groups often have an advantage over the general public in
influencing legislation. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
14 (University of Chicago Press 1991) (“Public choice models often treat the legislative
process as a microeconomic system in which ‘actual political choices are determined
by the efforts of individuals and groups to further their own interests’”) (quoting Gary S.
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371,
371 (1983); see also Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why
“Multiple Use” Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 415-422 (1994) (arguing that special
interest groups exert excessive influence over laws governing public land resources).
164.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
165.
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
166.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J.
1984).(“Beaches are a unique resource and are irreplaceable. The public demand for
beaches has increased with the growth of population and improvement of
transportation facilities.”); see also Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law Doctrines
and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 369, 369 (1973) (“[T]he fixed supply of
beaches, together with an increasing population, has led to a situation in which most
Americans, particularly those in urban settings, find the opportunities for beach
recreation continually dwindling.”).
167.
See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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that result from public recreational use of dry upland areas.168 As Professor
Rose observed, “[i]nsofar as recreation educates and socializes us, it acts as a
‘social glue’ for everyone, not just those immediately engaged. . . .”169
When courts unshackle the public trust doctrine from its historical
roots in navigable and tidally influenced waters,170 they can protect public
interests in uplands in two important ways. First, in the context of access
cases, courts can allow the public to assert its interest in accessing and using
dry upland beaches for recreational purposes alongside private interests in
excluding others and can ensure public access when the public interest
outweighs the private.171 Second, in the context of disposition cases, courts
can encourage better government decisionmaking regarding upland public
parks by giving a voice to the public’s interest in preserving traditional park
purposes.172 When courts give that voice a forum, the public can preserve its
right to free and open parklands and beaches available for recreation and can
hold government decisionmakers accountable when they fail to take that
interest into account.173 Together, those tools provide courts with a flexible
means of protecting the public’s recreational interests in uplands.
The public trust doctrine is not a static concept, fixed in time and
unsuitable to change in society. Instead, it is a common law doctrine ready
to meet the “felt necessities” of our time.174 Over a century ago, the United
States Supreme Court recognized the flexible nature of the public trust
doctrine, extending it from navigable and tidally influenced waters to waters
navigable in fact.175 Today, as an increasing population seeks access to
upland beaches and parks to recreate, relax, and socialize, the public trust
doctrine once more can serve to protect those interests now and for

168.
See supra notes 89-92, 156-159 and accompanying text.
169.
Rose, supra note 12, at 779.
170.
Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 186-188 (1980) (arguing that public trust doctrine should be
“unshackled” from its historic roots in tidelands and expanded to protect “reasonable
expectations” that the general public attaches to all public resources).
171.
See supra Section IV, notes 56-85 and accompanying text.
172.
See supra Section V, notes 96-151 and accompanying text; see also Sax, supra
note 23, at 560-561 (noting that the public trust doctrine serves a “democratiz[ing]”
function by enabling courts to remand an issue to the legislature when public
interests have not been adequately addressed).
173.
See Blumm, supra note 10, at 595 (“The [public trust] rules demanding
clear legislative revocations of the trust and close judicial scrutiny of administrative
alienation of trust resources ensure the public a meaningful opportunity to
participate in the allocation of trust resources and to hold accountable responsible
officials.”).
174.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown and Company
1938).
175.
See Barney, 94 U.S. at 337-338; see also The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12
How.) at 455.
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generations to come.
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